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ARGUMENT
The State at best exalts form over substance, and at worst
misleads the Court by arguing that petitioner's appeal should be
denied

for

focussing

only

on

the

Veterinary

Board

and

Administrative Law Judge's Findings and Conclusions rather than on
the Department's Order on Review. This argument overlooks the fact
that the only factual findings which have been made were made at an
evidentiary hearing before the Veterinary Board, which Findings and
Conclusions were adopted by the Division and affirmed in toto

by

the Department. Any challenge to factual sufficiency such as here,
must necessarily be directed at the substantive factual findings
and legal conclusions. In fact, the Petition for Review is of the
Department's Order adopting the Findings and Conclusions of the
Veterinary

Board.

Because

petitioner

has

exhausted

his

administrative remedies, he is entitled to be heard before this
Court on all issues presented.
Petitioner has also carried its marshalling burden, in that it
has

successfully

marshalled

the

evidence

in

support

of the

Department's findings, and has established that notwithstanding
this evidence, the Department's findings are not supported by
substantial record evidence.
Petitioner has adequately preserved the issues of due process
and substantial evidence as those issues relate to the Division's
findings of aggravating circumstances.
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On administrative review,

the Department was confronted with both issues, as evidenced by the
Order on Review.

Accordingly, petitioner has adequately preserved

the issues for review.
I.

TAYLOR HAS PROPERLY
REVIEW.

CHALLENGED

THE DEPARTMENT'S

ORDER

ON

The rule governing judicial review of final agency action
provides that

ff

[a] party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of

final agency action . . . . If
1996)•

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (Supp.

Related to this provision

Administrative Code.
aggrieved

party

is R151-46b-14 of the Utah

This provision sets forth the rule that an

may

only

seek

judicial

administrative remedies are exhausted.
Code R151-46b-14(1)

(1996).

review

after

other

See Utah Administrative

In this regard, judicial review is

justified once there has been final agency action.

See R151-46b-

14(2)

63-46b-14(1),

(1996).

Thus,

in accordance with section

judicial review of an agency decision is allowed once an order on
review has been issued by the particular agency.
In this

case, Dr. Taylor

has

fully

complied

with

these

provisions, insofar as he has exhausted his administrative remedies
in challenging the findings and conclusions of the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing, which have been affirmed
by the Department of Commerce in their entirety.

Now that a final

order on review has been issued by the Department of Commerce, Dr.
Taylor is now entitled to have his case judicially reviewed by this
Court.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1) .
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The State contends that Dr. Taylor's brief on appeal makes no
mention of the Department's Order on Review, and only focusses on
the Division's findings and conclusions.

This argument misses the

point of Dr. Taylor's appeal.
As is apparent from his appellate brief, a significant issue
on appeal in this case concerns the argument that the Division's
Findings of Fact are not supported by substantial evidence.
findings

are

subsequently

the

identical

adopted

by

findings

the

made

Director

Occupational and Professional Licensing.

of

by

the

the

These

Board,
Division

and
of

These findings were then

"incorporated as the findings of the Executive Director11 in the
Department's Order on Review affirming the Division's Order.
Significantly, Dr. Taylor challenges the findings of the Department
incorporated in its Order on Review.

As the Veterinary Board's

Findings and Conclusions are the substantive facts and law applied,
any challenge must of necessity be directed at that document.

The

State's tortured argument otherwise, at best, seeks to exalt form
over substance.
II.

DR. TAYLOR HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE IN THIS
CASE, AND THUS SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED THE DIVISION'S FINDINGS
OF FACT.
In order to successfully challenge the agency's findings of

fact, an aggrieved party has the burden of marshalling "all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show[ing] that despite the
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory

3

evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
King v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
63, 68

Accord Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d

(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Commerce, 810 P.2d

See also Heinecke v. Dep't of

459, 464 n.7

(Utah Ct. App. 1991)

(stating

'substantial evidence viewed in light of the whole record7 test
does not obviate need to marshal evidence).
In this case, Dr. Taylor has sufficiently marshalled

the

evidence in support of the findings below, and has established
that,

despite

such

supporting

facts,

and

in

light

of

the

conflicting and contradictory evidence, the agency's findings are
not supported by substantial evidence.

The marshalling performed

by Dr. Taylor in his first brief speaks for itself.

Thus, rather

than perform again its marshalling act, Dr. Taylor seeks in the
instant brief to reply to the State's arguments concerning Dr.
Taylor's failure to marshal the evidence.
Specifically, the State contends that, in marshalling

the

evidence, Dr. Taylor fails to consider his own testimony concerning
the care and services rendered to Hillary, the English bulldog.

In

regards to the care rendered to Hillary, the only evidence at
hearing supporting the agency's findings came from the testimony of
Hillary's owner and Dr. Mayling Chinn.1

l

Dr. Chinn is the veterinarian visited by Hillary after she
was seen at the Brookside Animal Hospital. Her testimony runs
from pages 150 to 215 of the transcript.
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The testimony from Hillary's owner indicated that two of the
pups were delivered before Hillary was brought into the clinic. At
the

clinic,

the

evidence

indicated

that

Dr.

Taylor

"felt

[Hillary's] stomach," examined the puppy that was stillborn and
explained that the puppies were all premature, and that Hillary was
passing them fine by herself and no cesarian section would be
required.

(Transcript, 161:5 - 162:15) Other puppies were passed

at the clinic, but, notwithstanding this, Hillary's owner became
impatient and took Hillary home where labor continued.
168:4 - 170)

(Transcript

Yet another stillborn pup was born at home,

whereupon, after being unable to contact Dr. Taylor's clinic, the
owner took Hillary to Dr. Chinn, who removed

the remaining

stillborn pups by way of cesarian section.
Dr. Chinn testified regarding the propriety of palpating an
English bulldog to determine the number and size of the litter. In
her testimony, Dr. Chinn

stated

something you do on an exam."

that "[p]alpation

is always

Dr. Chinn testified, however, that

if the dog is of a larger breed, then a radiograph is more
appropriate to determine the number and size of the dog's litter.
Because no radiograph was taken by Dr. Taylor, Dr. Chinn opined
that Dr. Taylor's standard

of

care fell below the accepted

standard.

(Transcript 204:14 to 205:7) This was the only evidence

regarding

Hillary's

care

supporting

the

agency's

findings.

The State argues that in marshalling the evidence, Dr. Taylor
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has failed to draw on examples from his own testimony that support
the agency's findings of gross negligence and
conduct vis-a-vis Hillary.

unprofessional

See State's Brief, at 15 n.2.

The

first example deals with Dr. Taylor's statement that he would have
performed a cesarian section on Hillary. The second example is Dr.
Taylor's statement that, given the structure of an English bulldog,
palpating is not always effective and, therefore, he always offers
to take an x-ray of the dog.
Taylor's testimony.

These examples misrepresent Dr.

In context, Dr. Taylor testified that he did

not take care of Hillary during her stay at the Brookside Animal
Clinic. Moreover, the testimony reveals that Dr. Taylor only spoke
with Hillary's

owner

on one earlier occasion, and

that the

conversation concerned the scheduling of a cesarian section.
(Transcript 371:4 - 11) Indeed, Dr. Taylor's testimony concerning
the palpating of dogs to secure an idea of the number and size of
the litter, and the limits imposed by the size of particular breeds
in conducting such palpations, is corroborated by Dr. Chinn, who,
as explained above, indicated that palpating can be difficult given
the size of some dogs, and that an x-ray is a more appropriate
method when larger dogs are involved. This evidence in no way adds
to the other evidence concerning the care received by Hillary, to
support the agency's findings.

Dr. Taylor's testimony at bottom

was that he did not treat Hillary.

Including his testimony in

marshalling the evidence will not help the Division as argued in

6

their brief.
performed

Otherwise, Dr. Taylor relies on the marshalling

in his

opening

brief, and

maintains

that

he has

successfully fulfilled his marshalling burden.
III. PETITIONER HAS ADEQUATELY PRESERVED THE ISSUES RAISED IN HIS
FIRST BRIEF.
The State contends that Dr. Taylor has waived his right to
appeal the issues of due process and substantial evidence, as those
issues relate to the Division's findings regarding aggravating
circumstances.
As the State points out, questions that are not raised below
in an administrative tribunal are not subject to judicial review,
except in exceptional circumstances.
Sales v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d

See Alvin G. Rhodes Pump
1244, 1249

(Utah 1984);

Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
This rule, however, is inapplicable to the facts of this case, and
contrary to the State's contention, petitioner has adequately
preserved the issues below.
To understand Dr. Taylor's preservation of the issues of due
process and substantial evidence, it is essential to consider the
issues examined below by the Department together with the issues
raised by Dr. Taylor on appeal.

In the instant case, Dr. Taylor

challenges the Division's findings of aggravating circumstances,
including the finding that Dr. Taylor failed to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of his conduct, or to undertake good efforts to
restitute or rectify the consequences of his misconduct.
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Dr.

Taylor argues that the Division failed to notify him that such lack
of contrition, or recalcitrance, might constitute unprofessional
conduct or aggravate the sanction ultimately imposed.
Dr. Taylor also argues that the finding

of aggravating

circumstances is not supported by substantial evidence.

In this

regard, Dr. Taylor argues that no record evidence supports such
findings, and that the only statements that could support such
findings were made by opposing counsel during closing statements.
See Appellant's

Brief,

at

43-44.

Those

statements

do

not

constitute evidence, and were not based on any evidence in the
record.

Thus, the findings of recalcitrance, lack of contrition,

and failure to rectify or make restitution is not supported by
substantial

evidence.

The

State's

argument,

however,

as a

prefatory matter misses the point. Preservation of issues occurs,
if at all, during the evidentiary phase of a proceeding, not during
the course of administrative review.

As surely as the factual

issues are found and legal conclusions reached during the course
and at the conclusion of the evidentiary proceeding, so must a
record be made by the complaining appellant, if at all, during that
evidentiary proceeding.

Indeed, in this case when Dr. Taylor

sought review by the administrative agency as a prerequisite to
filing the instant petition for review, the Department merely
reviewed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the
Veterinary Board, the memoranda of the parties, and without more,
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affirmed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

No hearing

was held, no evidence was taken, and no additional Findings made.
To follow the State's argument to its logical conclusion with
respect to the question of the sufficiency of the Division's
Finding of aggravating circumstances and the impact of that finding
on Dr. Taylor's due process would be to require Dr. Taylor to
anticipate during the course of the evidentiary hearing below that
a factual finding would be made not based on substantial evidence,
indeed, not based on any evidence at all but merely the statements
of counsel, and to anticipate that the Division would act in such
a way as to violate his due process.

Dr. Taylor would then have

been required to produce evidence and sustain the burden of proving
his contrition and of his due process rights.

Similarly, Dr.

Taylor cannot have waived his right to challenge the inadequacies
of the substantial evidence supporting the Division's Finding of
aggravating circumstances or the Veterinary Board's violation of
his due process, since such right was not at that time known to
exist.

See generally Soters, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings &

Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993).
Moreover, the issues raised by Dr. Taylor in the instant
appeal were sufficiently preserved below before the Department of
Commerce.

This is evidenced by the Department's Order on Review.

Several references are made in the Department's Order, relating to
the Division's definition of "unprofessional conduct," and the
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challenges made by Dr. Taylor to those definitions. Specifically,
the Department stated that "[Dr. Taylor] challenges the finding
that [he] engaged in unprofessional conduct by setting forth the
proposition

that

the

terms

'gross

negligence,'

'gross

incompetence,' and 'pattern of incompetency or negligence' must be
defined before they can, in turn, be used to define 'unprofessional
conduct./M

See Order on Review, at 56.

Dr. Taylor also asserted

before the Department that "the terms 'gross incompetence' and
'gross negligence' are unconstitutionally vague as used in the
licensing act and are therefore of no legal force or effect upon
[him]."

See Order on Review, at 58. Similarly, Dr. Taylor in the

instant appeal challenges the failure of the Division to adequately
define the term "unprofessional conduct" given its failure to
notify him that recalcitrance and lack of contrition can amount to
unprofessional conduct. Although not couched exactly in terms used
below before the Department, Dr. Taylor's argument regarding due
process in this case should nonetheless be well-taken by this
Court.

See generally Indian Village Trading Post v. Bench, 929

P. 2d 367, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

(regardless of appellee's

failure to specifically couch issue in exact terms relied upon by
appellate court in affirming, issue, as couched by appellate court,
was nonetheless appropriate for review).
Dr. Taylor argued the specific issue of "substantial evidence"
before the Department, as that issue relates to the general
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findings of unprofessional conduct.

As stated by the Department,

"[Dr.

or

Taylor]'s

primary

argument,

at

least

most

extended

exposition in his brief, is to the proposition that the findings of
the Board are either not founded upon substantial evidence or that
the

finding

conflicts

with

evidence

[Dr. Taylor]

deems

more

substantial in providing support to his contentions." See Order on
Review, at 9.

Like the due process issue, Dr. Taylor

in the

instant appeal challenges the Board's factual findings regarding
the

aggravating

circumstances

that

amount

to

unprofessional

conduct. As discussed in his first brief, the only statements made
in the record which could directly support the Board's findings in
this regard are the statements of counsel for the Division in his
closing argument.

Although not couched in exactly the same terms

as

Order

found

in

the

on

Review,

the

issue

adequately preserved for the instant appeal.

was

nonetheless

See generally id. at

369.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner has adequately challenged the Department's Order on
Review, and has complied with the statutory language requiring the
exhaustion of his administrative remedies.

Petitioner has also

successfully marshalled the evidence in this case.

The examples

cited to by the State misrepresent Dr. Taylor's testimony, and do
not

support

the

Department's

findings

vis-a-vis

Hillary.

Petitioner has also adequately preserved all issues appealed to
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this

Court.

The

administrative

bodies

below

have

had

the

opportunity to hear the issues as presented by petitioner in the
instant appeal, and have ruled on those issues. Accordingly, it is
time for this Court to consider all issues presented by petitioner.
Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 1997.
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